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Abstract –  
There are over two hundred and fifty suicides on the railway in Great Britain (GB) each year. 
Descriptive statistics are compiled, producing national and international data.  The industry 
know how many and, to a limited extent, where these fatalities occur.  There is little in-depth 
analysis of events.    Therefore, there are gaps in knowledge of these fatalities and this is a 
weakness when considering the best approaches to prevention.   This paper reports on the 
analysis of data on 257 suicide events at or near to 51 stations on three rail routes in Great 
Britain over a 20 year period.  The analysis uses data from the industry Safety Management 
System (SMIS) database and produces simple descriptive statistics on a range of variables, 
including comparisons across the three rail routes.    Additional data from staff and route based 
documentation have been used to verify, supplement and interpret information in the database.  
Examples of patterns of immediate and precursor behaviours during incidents have been 
presented, illustrating the potential to explore both common and anomalous behaviours during 
events.  The findings demonstrate the type of content that can be explored within the industry 
data and through use of other data that are available within the industry.  Commentary is 
provided on the strengths and weaknesses of the data and how findings from the analysis can be 
used to improve future data collection and prevention of incidents. 
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Introduction 
There are over two hundred and fifty fatalities due to suicide each year on the GB rail network [1].  This is 
a problem that is shared with many other countries (e.g. in Europe and worldwide), with distress to train 
crew and the public, damage to trains and infrastructure and significant impacts on rail network 
performance, in addition to the consequences for the person attempting suicide.  Predicting the locations of 
future events, identifying those at risk and understanding the effectiveness of solutions to railway suicide 
are difficult challenges for the industry and researchers who are working on this topic.   
From a practical point of view, information on rail suicide events is collected by a number of different 
stakeholders.  For example, the British Transport Police collect evidence to determine whether there are 
any suspicious circumstances (e.g. a crime rather than a suicide) and their findings are used subsequently 
by the coroner in inquests to determine the cause of death.  Other details of events are collected by first 
responders to events in the industry (e.g. Network Rail staff).  Witness statements can be collected from 
drivers or people who might have seen the event at platforms or railway crossings.  Evidence on what 
happened may be available from CCTV cameras at stations.  However, information from these different 
sources is not generally shared across organisations or easily accessible. 
Details of the incidents are compiled, classified and recorded in various sources, such as organisational 
databases (e.g. the industry Safety Management Information System (SMIS) database - 
http://www.rssb.co.uk/risk-analysis-and-safety-reporting/reporting-systems/smis) and other industry 
records which contain details of the times, locations and circumstances of events.  These sources contribute 
to summary statistics, such as those provided in the RSSB Annual Safety Performance Report [1] or 
European wide statistics [2], covering fatalities and injuries arising from work, travel or other interactions 
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with the rail network. These data give an overall understanding of the national and international 
distributions of events (e.g. details of numbers of suicides, indications of locations, demographic details 
and national trends, in conjunction with other rail safety data).  Similar analyses can be found in a variety 
of academic publications, for example containing comparisons of the numbers of train suicides from 
statistics from different country, the ratio of male to female suicides, train suicide as a proportion of all 
suicides and the fatality rate for rail suicide attempts [3].  Many studies have sought to investigate the types 
of factors that can influence incidents, attempting to draw conclusions on the impacts of individual (age, 
gender, health / mental health), situational (location, time of day, frequency of trains, type of train, crowding 
at stations), environmental (weather and lighting conditions) and socioeconomic factors (indicators of 
deprivation) on these types of incidents. Table 1 shows a wide range of factors that have been considered 
in a selection of reviews (e.g. [3], [4]) and other studies.   
[Table 1 about here] 
There has clearly been an extensive set of investigations of a wide range of factors (Table 1).  There are 
some areas of consistency in the findings (e.g. slight dominance of male suicides on the railway [10], [11]) 
and much variation (e.g. in the numbers of seasonal, monthly or weekly fatalities or patterns in the time of 
day [26-31]).  There are a few areas with differences (e.g. the influence or lack of influence of railway 
parameters such as train frequency or population density [9], [37]; or different opinions on the impulsive 
or pre-planned nature of these events [13], [14]).  Some of the differences might be explained by national 
differences (cultural or structural factors such as the density of the railway [37]) or because phenomena are 
measured in a different way across studies.  Some important explanatory details (e.g. from Table 1) are not 
collected routinely and even if they are, they are not classified and used effectively in prevention. For 
example, no studies so far have collected detailed data on the specific line on which incidents occur, 
precisely where they occur and how people get access to these points of the railway.  There is also limited 
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published evidence on details of behaviour of people prior to incidents.  References to pre-suicidal 
behaviours have so far focused on actions or behaviour which might arouse suspicion in observers, such as 
dropping possessions, erratic gestures and wearing unusual clothing [15], [20], [22], [23].  Efforts have also 
been made to classify how people make contact with the train (“jumping”, “lying”, “wandering”) [24], 25]. 
However, descriptive details of these behaviours are limited and focus on behaviours that are often too late 
in time to help with prevention.      
In this study, information in the SMIS database has been reviewed and used to learn more about incidents 
that have occurred at a sample of stations over an extensive period of time.  This database is compiled and 
updated by rail organisations (e.g. RSSB, Network Rail), collecting data on a wide variety of accidents and 
incidents in the rail industry.  In relation to rail suicide, the database contains basic descriptions of the time, 
location and circumstances of the events and incorporates updates over time as new information emerges.  
This could include extracts from driver statements, relevant details from the British Transport Police logs 
and results from Coroners’ inquests.  This database is therefore a potential source of a broad range of 
information on these incidents.   Findings are presented from the analysis of fatalities that have occurred at 
or near to stations in three areas close to London over a 20 year period.  It therefore aims to determine the 
type of information that can be identified from industry databases and other documentation about the 
incidents, including the locations of incidents, the potential to identify any patterns or trends in incidents 
and details of other factors that could influence the occurrence of the events.  The findings from this analysis 
are used to explain what can be understood about fatality events on the rail network and how this knowledge 
can be used in improving approaches to prevention. 
Method 
General overview of the study 
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The study collates and analyses content from an industry database to develop a broader understanding of 
what is known about fatalities across a sample of stations and connecting track areas, over an extended time 
period.  The analysis also intended to explore whether more learning could occur by looking in greater 
detail at some of the narrative content in the organisational records, in addition to other more commonly 
used content on circumstances surrounding these events (e.g. demographics, general descriptions of 
locations and train types).      
Data sources 
The primary source of data for this study is the SMIS (Safety Management Information System) database. 
Data from SMIS have been transferred to an Excel spreadsheet and supplemented where necessary with 
additional data and interpretation from staff in the industry.  This includes records such as Event Review 
Forms (completed after a fatality by Network Rail staff to collect details of the location, prevention 
measures in place and issues needing rectification) and information from Network Rail’s Performance 
Review Reports (reporting on a selection of events causing major disruption to traffic on the network, 
though with an emphasis on mitigation of consequences of the events rather than prevention).  Relevant 
information from these sources, where available for a limited sun-set of incidents, was summarised in a 
single text field in the spreadsheet. 
The original data set that was used contained details of all fatalities (suicide and accidental, N=344 over a 
20 year period at the locations that have been selected for this study).      Two hundred and fifty seven of 
these incidents have been classified as suicides or narrative verdicts in the database and these have been 
included within the current study. . 
Study locations 
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To enable focus in greater depth on the suicide incidents, analyses have been carried out on three lengths 
of railway routes, situated close to London.  The standard railway configuration on mainline railway in 
Great Britain is typically four track railway, with two fast lines (higher line speeds and infrequent stops at 
stations) and two slower lines (slower line speeds and where trains stop at most stations), though there is 
some variation in parts of the rail routes (e.g. two track railway or areas with additional electric lines). The 
railway is secured by fencing throughout the network and the easiest places of access tend to be at station 
platforms and railway crossings.  There are occasions where people climb fencing or get access to the 
railway from road bridges over the railway.  As such, historically, there have been greater numbers of 
fatalities at platforms and crossings, though it is also fairly common for people to move to other parts of 
the railway after getting access to the railway at these locations. 
The stations in these three areas represent a range of characteristics, such as large mainline station locations 
serving densely populated areas and smaller stations in a mixture of urban and rural locations, with differing 
station configurations, track layouts, train services and stopping patterns.  There are no rail crossings 
currently on these sections of mainline track.  Descriptions of the three study areas are provided in Table 
2. 
[Table 2 about here]  
Many of the stations have similar layouts, though there is clearly some variation in the stations.  Figure 1a 
shows a typical station layout, illustrating the locations of platforms (shaded blocks) adjacent to the rail 
lines.  These lines can be defined as faster lines (up main and down main) or slower lines (up relief and 
down relief); though there are some different naming conventions between the different study areas.  At 
some stations, where trains do not stop, there are no platforms facing the fast lines, or these platforms are 
not accessible to passengers.  Therefore, there is often no direct access to these faster lines.  Figure 1b 
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shows an example of one of the stations with no facing platform to the fast lines, though it is possible for 
people to cross from slower line platforms to get access to the fast lines.   
[Figures 1a and 1b about here] 
 
Procedure for data collation and analysis 
A preliminary meeting was held with RSSB staff to discuss requirements for the analysis.  A data set 
containing selected fields from the national SMIS database (i.e. fields which could supply content on the 
factors in Table 1) was received in an Excel format from analysts at RSSB.  Incidents, both at and between 
stations in the three areas were identified using text searches.   Details from SMIS were cross-checked for 
accuracy with information from other documents that were held by staff who have responsibility for fatality 
prevention in each of the three routes.   
Preliminary analysis of the content of the data sources was started using data from one of the three areas. 
Categorical, numerical fields and text descriptions were read and verified.  Relevant data types were 
identified and a set of categories was established to record relevant information for each incident.  The 
categories are listed in Table 3, along with details of the source and method of coding.  Data relating to 
these categories were extracted and summarised in a new spreadsheet.  Categories were revised and refined 
on this first pass through the data, returning to re-classify earlier content where necessary, to ensure 
consistency in collation and classification of the data.  The process of collating and classifying content from 
the data sources was then applied to incidents in the second and third areas.  The data types and categories 
were reviewed and refined at each stage of the analysis.  Several variables from Table 1 have not been 
considered in this study.  Socioeconomic data on these factors are not readily available and even where 
they are, at a regional level, are not easy to link to rail locations.  Fatality rate was also not explored as all 
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events in this study were fatalities.  There is low confidence currently in the reliability of records for suicide 
attempts in the database, especially going back over time. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Preliminary findings from the analysis were discussed at a meeting with Network Rail route representatives.  
This was a useful opportunity to check initial interpretations of the data and the relevance of the findings.  
Some gaps in the source material made it difficult to identify and classify some content in a moderate 
proportion of incidents, such as the point of access to the track.  Additional information was provided by 
Network Rail (e.g. using headcodes - train identifying numbers) to help with classification of the line on 
which the fatality incidents occurred. 
Analysis 
The content of the dataset has been described.  Descriptive statistics have been used to summarise the 
findings for each study area and for the whole sample of stations and connecting track areas, enabling 
comparisons across the three areas for each of the main study variables.  Proportions have also been 
calculated for each variable.  For example, the proportions of incidents that occurred at stations, on the open 
line and at other locations have been calculated and the variation across the three study areas has been 
assessed (e.g. differences in proportions of incidents at stations across the study areas).  Gaps in the data 
sources have been identified (e.g. missing data on access points or train types).  Findings have also been 
compared with reference data (e.g. from other published literature, Table 1).  Cross-tabulation and Chi-
square analyses have been used to investigate associations between age (<40, 40-60, >60), gender and the 
choice of location for suicide (stations or open line; fast lines or slower lines) and the impact of different 
lighting conditions (daylight, dark and dawn/dusk).  Exploratory analysis has been used to examine trends 
(e.g. the numbers of incidents at stations by year).    Narrative data from the SMIS database have been 
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classified, to identify standardised descriptions of immediate behaviours, precursor behaviours and 
contextual factors for each event.  The immediate behaviour in this analysis relates to the last reported 
action that is described in the report (i.e. the behaviour that puts the person in a place of risk).  Other 
references to behaviours prior to this are classified as precursor behaviours.  There are many occasions 
within the reports in which short sequences of precursor behaviours are evident. Other descriptive content 
is often reported, such as the context in which an action takes place.  The descriptions of the immediate and 
precursor behaviours and contextual factors have been represented in a tabular format, illustrating common 
groupings of behaviours in the period leading up to these events.  The relative frequencies of behaviours 
prior to an event have been indicated.   
Results 
Types of incidents 
Descriptive statistics were produced for all main variables (as listed above) and summarised in Table 4. 
The findings have been interpreted within the final column of this table. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Locations of suicide incidents 
Of the 257 fatality events that have been selected for more analysis, approximately seventy percent of these 
occurred at stations, though there was quite a lot of variation across the three areas for this and many of the 
other variables.  Fewer fatalities occurred on the open line and only one occurred at a crossing.  The 
mainline crossings on these lines have been closed for a considerable time and the main access to the 
railway is at stations.  Seventy percent of the incidents occurred on the fast lines, where trains do not stop 
at most stations.  There is an approximately equal split of incidents in up and down directions (towards and 
away from London), but this varies across the routes.  Differences could potentially be influenced by factors 
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such as the design of stations.  For example, a line that is situated near to the station concourse might be 
chosen as it is the first platform which a person encounters.  It was not possible to determine the lines on 
which incidents occurred in a small proportion of the events, due to the absence of descriptive information.  
There can still be a sizable proportion of events on slower lines (0.19-0.36), or not in the station (0.18-
0.37).  It is interesting to note that one of the incidents that occurred on a slow line was at night, at a station 
where the fast lines were under an engineering possession at the time.  Therefore, the train involved in the 
incident was likely to have been a fast, non-stopping train, but diverted to travel on the slow line.   This 
type of contextual detail was identified in discussions with industry staff and was not recorded in the 
database.     
The access point to the track was commonly from the platform (more than two thirds of incidents).  Access 
from the ramp at the platform end was only identifiable in up to 11% of these cases of access from the 
platform.  It is not clear whether this represents the true proportion accessing the track in this way, or 
whether this reflects the lack of descriptive detail on the point of access in accounts of the incident.  In 
around 6% of incidents access to the track was from a road bridge over the railway.  Whilst there are 
references in the databases to access via gates, fences and footpaths in some incidents, in approximately 
15% of the incidents it is not possible to classify the point of access with any confidence. It is important to 
note that the point of access may be some distance from the point of the incident (e.g. because a person 
may have crossed or moved along railway lines).   
Whilst suicides commonly occurred at or near platforms in stations, there were several stations where there 
was a tendency for greater numbers of incidents outside of the station.  In these cases, people may have 
moved out of the station to the point at which the incident occurred.  It is possible that these were influenced 
by the availability of places of concealment, such as bridges or electrical cabinets, or due to the curvature 
of the track, enabling the person to hide before the approach of the train.  Other factors that might have 
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influenced this included the location of built up areas nearby, access via road bridges and foot crossings 
and access to faster trains outside of the stations (i.e. at larger stations where more trains on fast lines stop, 
train speeds will be faster outside the station).  It is also possible that differences might be explained by 
differences in record keeping (e.g. records were more detailed for fatalities at junctions or access points in 
some areas than in others). 
Characteristics of stations 
Table 5 shows how there were regular incidents at some lines at stations, in contrast with the apparently 
sporadic nature of incidents at other locations (e.g. where there has been a gap of several years between 
incidents).   It is not known why incidents occur in some locations or at specific times and not others.  As 
a result of the relatively small numbers of incidents at any particular location, it is also not known whether 
analysis of the historical data can give an understanding of future risk of incidents at a station or on a 
specific line.   
[Table 5 about here] 
The configuration of the stations has been considered.  It is evident that there have been situations where 
access to the point of collision with the train has not been from an adjacent platform and it has been 
necessary to cross other lines to get to the point of impact.  This has occurred in situations where a platform 
serving a fast line has been fenced off in an earlier intervention (Figure 2a) or where faster lines do not run 
close to platforms (Figure 1b and 2b).  This type of behaviour (i.e. crossing lines) is not easily identifiable 
or recorded in the available data.  Additional descriptive data relating to the station is needed to understand 
more about how people take the opportunity to get access to the track where they can and move to find the 
first, most convenient or fastest train. Movements around stations and the track area in this way clearly 
have implications for where and how to introduce an intervention (e.g. fencing or surveillance) 
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[Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
Times of incident 
There are higher numbers of off-peak events and this might indicate a desire for seclusion.   However, as a 
note of caution, the analysis in the current study has not been conducted using equal time intervals, so a 
longer off-peak time period could contribute to the higher proportion of incidents.  Most incidents occurred 
in the daylight in this study in Great Britain.   Comparable data from other European countries such as the 
Czech Republic, Finland, Poland and Sweden, (see www.restrail.eu for more information about the 
RESTRAIL project) showed a greater tendency for night time incidents.  The lower numbers of incidents 
at night or early morning and in darkness might be influenced by the fact that there are fewer trains during 
these periods and less frequent opportunities for these types of events.  
Yearly trends 
Preliminary analyses indicate that there may be an increase in the overall numbers of incidents over the 
years, a trend that is apparent in national data, as well as the data from these routes (Figure 3).   
[Figure 3 about here] 
There are indications of differences in the study areas, such as for numbers of incidents at stations, on the 
open line, or on fast and slow lines.  These fluctuations that can be influenced by a range of factors.  For 
example, one staff member suggested that lower numbers of fatalities in 2008 on one of the areas might be 
a result of the engineering blockages that occurred over that time period, with a reduction in train journeys.  
It is likely that the numbers of incidents over time might be sensitive to a variety of changes in the railway 
environment, including recent efforts to reduce suicides through a variety of fencing interventions and staff 
training.  Reductions in incidents in recent years may be an indication of the success of these recent safety 
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interventions.   However, there is need to be cautious about the interpretation of any trends, because of the 
relatively small numbers of incidents on these lines at these stations. 
Evidence on other influencing factors 
Two thirds of those involved were male, in cases where gender was recorded.  Records for age are presented 
(Table 4), but details were missing in forty percent of the events.  Analyses demonstrated no association 
between gender and choice of location or the time at which the events occur (Table 4).  There is an 
indication that the older age group (>60) have been involved in more events than would have been expected 
on slower lines, but these findings should be treated with some caution, given the gaps in the data on age.   
Mental health issues were identified in a relatively small proportion of the incidents.  The analysis also 
demonstrates that little is recorded about other medical or social issues that may have influenced the events.  
These findings might be indicative of gaps in reporting, rather than providing reliable information on the 
health status of those involved.   
Witnesses to the events have been classified (Tables 3 and 4).  Drivers were the most common witnesses 
and often the only witnesses (according to details in the records), especially for incidents on the open line.  
It was often not easy to identify from the records whether events occurred on crowded or isolated platforms.   
In determining whether isolation could be an influencing factor, it is worth investigating whether the 
numbers of incidents are different at staffed and unstaffed stations.  However, more site specific details 
would be needed to understand the potential effects of having platform staff, booking office staff or no staff 
at a station. 
The train type is only identifiable in the databases for approximately half of the incidents (Table 4).  There 
is considerable variation in the type of train that is recorded and this might be explained by differences in 
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recording in databases on different rail routes.  The findings do not present conclusive evidence of the 
choice of high speed trains for rail suicide. 
Behaviours of people prior to incidents 
It has been possible to identify some common patterns of access to the track, describing the immediate 
mode of access and precursor behaviours, using a set of standardised terms.  Sequences of behaviour and 
other descriptive content from the narrative reports in the database are shown in a series of Tables.  Table 
6a shows the most common immediate behaviour of jumping or stepping from the platform into the path 
of the train (86 of these incidents) and the range of precursor behaviours that preceded this immediate 
behaviour.  These precursor behaviours have been classified into categories of movements, waiting 
behaviours and looking / searching behaviours.  Additional descriptive data are also presented (e.g. how 
actions were described or reports of warnings from the driver’s horn).   The precursors show evidence of 
visual indications of risk (e.g. standing close to the platform edge), which could be used to help plan better 
safety interventions.  The analysis was also sensitive enough to pick up an indication in one event that a 
person might be hesitating prior to getting access to the track (i.e. stepping back temporarily).  More 
extensive interpretations of the content of these sequences of behaviour are shown in the final column of 
Table 6.   
Other immediate behaviours are shown in Tables 6b to 6d.  These include descriptive details of how people 
waited on the track for the arrival of the train, movements around the track area in front of the train and a 
number of less common modes of access to the train or other causes of death. Similar analyses have been 
conducted to describe the range of precursor behaviours and contextual factors that are noted within the 
reports. Gaps in the data are also evident.  For example, it was not possible to classify the immediate 
behaviour in 40 of the 257 events.  In a small number of these the witness (usually the driver) had noticed 
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some earlier behaviour (e.g. jumping on the line, standing close to the edge), but they were not able to say 
more about what happened immediately before impact.     
Overall, this type of analysis helps to summarise the range of behavioural and contextual details for a wide 
range of events.   The analysis illustrates the most common and unusual behaviours and circumstances in 
this sample of incidents. The contents of Tables 6a to 6d help to explore pathways or common sequences 
in behaviours during incidents.  These give some insight into the sudden or impulsive nature of some of 
these events, in comparison with the more deliberative and planned nature of others. Time is not shown 
explicitly in the analysis, but this can be inferred from the content and can inform decisions on the types of 
prevention measures that may be appropriate (e.g. there is little time to intervene when someone moves 
from behind an object and jumps into the path of the train).  However, it might be hard to separate some of 
these observed behaviours from other behaviours of passengers that can be seen at stations.      
 
[Table 6 about here] 
Discussion 
This study has examined a substantial set of incidents over a lengthy time period, covering a wide range of 
station types.  These are based on events from locations near to 51 of the 2500 stations nationally and, by 
nature of their locations, expand knowledge of the characteristics and factors that could influence suicide 
incidents at and in the vicinity of mainline stations in Great Britain.  They are less likely to reflect conditions 
on other commuter or more rural branch lines with greater numbers of crossings, alternative access points 
to the railway and differences in train service and stopping patterns.  Furthermore, these findings may not 
generalise well to situations in other countries.  Nevertheless, the analysis has investigated a good range of 
incidents, using a combination of simple descriptive statistics and analysis of narrative content.    
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This research has considered the potential value of different types of information (e.g. Table 1 for potential 
influencing factors for rail suicide).  This analysis has produced a better understanding of the type of content 
that is available in sources that are accessible to rail organisations, including appraisal of the effort that is 
needed in identifying, collating and analysing the data.  The industry may need to consider where future 
work is targeted on the study of different factors. Mishara and Bardon [4], on the basis of their systematic 
review of a wide of previous research, consider that there may be little to learn from more descriptive 
epidemiological studies covering the same variables. The current study has shown what is accessible when 
planning to examine a wide range of variables (e.g. locations, time, mental health, train type, level of 
seclusion or crowding on platforms).  The study also had the motivation to look more widely for new factors 
that can be considered.  There are limitations in some of the existing sources of data, including the detail 
that is available, the precision of the content, missing content and differences in details in databases and 
other sources of information.  There will be value in conducting detailed analysis of the content that is 
embedded within the narrative fields in the SMIS database (e.g. the line on which the incident occurred), 
though some effort is needed in extracting, verifying, supplementing and coding the content for the 
analyses.  However, the descriptive details are often limited and additional information may be available 
from other sources (e.g. Network Rail and British Transport Police data).   
On balance, the industry database gives a good understanding of how many incidents occur and, to a limited 
extent, where these occur (e.g. at or near to specific stations).  Preliminary comparisons have been 
conducted across data from different routes.  This has demonstrated the variation across these rail routes 
for a number of different variables and how national proportions do not reflect local situations.  As an 
example, it has been reported how around 40 per cent of suicides occur at stations [1], and it might be 
reasonable to expect that strategies for safety interventions could be developed with this in mind.  However, 
the analysis has shown that the proportions of incidents at stations can be much higher and are likely to 
vary on different parts of the network.  This type of variation can occur for a number of situational, 
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geographical, cultural and individual reasons.  The practical significance of these differences needs more 
consideration, especially how it will influence the planning of safety prevention measures at these locations. 
The current analysis has shown that it is important to understand precise details of the location of the 
incident, especially getting clarity on the line of the incident, the point of access and behaviours such as 
crossing of other lines to reach the point of contact with the train.  It is often hard to identify from the 
records exactly where the incident occurred (i.e. where in the station, how far from the station and on which 
line).  Furthermore, it is clear that multiple locations are important; the place of access is different to the 
place at which someone is struck and these can be different to the place at which the body is found or at 
which the train eventually stops.  These differences are all likely to contribute to imprecision or errors in 
organisational records and related statistics.  Currently, these details are not collected and recorded 
systematically in the industry.  Even if these are known, these are hard to identify from narrative content of 
the database.     Useful information was obtained in this study by collecting additional information from 
industry staff, helping with understanding of what really happened within an incident (e.g. a fast train 
operating on a slow line in one of the cases).  More work is needed to make this type of local knowledge 
more widely accessible within industry records. 
Relatively little is also known about how events occur.  There are gaps in knowledge of events and this is 
a weakness when considering the best approaches to prevention. Whilst these are clearly very serious 
events, involving loss of life and major disruption to train services (with high averages costs and annual 
costs to the industry [39]), these have not typically been subject to the type of investigation that occurs 
when other serious incidents and fatalities occur on the railway [40].  There are examples of good practice 
in the industry (e.g. serious incident reviews, carried out where there has been extensive delay arising from 
an incident) and use of a psychological autopsy study to collect in-depth knowledge of the events [41].  
There will be value in broadening the scope of investigations, based on best practice for incident 
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investigation [42]. This could include conducting investigations around a suitable model of accidents or 
events, using an appropriate taxonomy to structure the collection and analysis of data and ensuring that 
learning takes place within and across relevant organisations and stakeholders. 
The study has contributed to understanding of patterns of immediate and precursor behaviours.  The 
identification and representation of the immediate behaviours  associated with the events adds depth to 
earlier classifications that are available in the literature on the modes of access to the track (e.g. the study 
of behaviours such as jumping, lying and wandering on the track [24], [25]).  The precursors have been 
found to have common features; covering the movements, waiting behaviours and searching behaviours of 
the people involved in these incidents. The analysis gives an indication of the relative frequencies of 
common types of events and behaviours, as well as the locations in which they occur, going beyond the 
anecdotal reports in some of the earlier published sources [15], [22].  For example, the findings demonstrate 
the very late and often sudden movements from platforms into the path of the train in a high proportion of 
incidents (86/257).  The content shows the determination of those involved (pushing past people).  There 
is also a high proportion of incidents where people are in the track area for a longer period of time (105/257).  
These include movements along and across the track and efforts to search for trains, before standing, 
crouching or lying down to make contact with the train.  The analysis has also identified less common 
incidents (e.g. sitting on the edge of the platform, leaning into the path of the train).   Each, the more 
common and the unique, present different challenges for prevention.  The detailed, descriptive findings 
provide knowledge that is fundamental to the correct specification of recommendations for prevention (e.g. 
through use of physical barriers, station design, interventions by people).  However, in spite of efforts to 
collect and analyse the detail, it is notable that the reports often contain relatively little descriptive details.  
It was not possible to conduct this type of analysis for forty of the events.  The distinguishing features of 
some incidents may provide useful lines of enquiry and could be used as prompts for the routine collection 
of better data in future analyses of these types of events.  It should be noted that this analysis of the text has 
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been conducted by a single analyst and further work is needed to consider the reliability of the classification 
[43], including extension of this work to cover a wider range of incidents at different types of locations.  
A wide range of factors that can influence railway suicide events have been considered in this study.  Table 
7 includes a brief overview of conclusions from the review of literature and the analysis of the data in the 
current study, also offering new guidance for improvements in the collection and use of data on a range of 
relevant variables associated with railway suicide. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Conclusion and future work 
There is a lot of information on rail suicide events recorded and available to the industry.     Some types of 
information may be more useful than others in explaining the incident.  The study has shown how important 
new knowledge can be uncovered from a detailed analysis of the data and through incorporation of local 
knowledge from staff in the industry, giving a new perspective to some details in the data.  The value of 
qualitative analysis of text and descriptive data has been illustrated, as well as the need to go beyond basic 
presentation of statistics, which on their own can give misleading or incomplete descriptions of the events 
and circumstances surrounding the fatalities.    More could be learned about the nature of the problem with 
more in-depth investigation and analysis of incidents as they occur, improvements in recording of some 
type of information and sharing of important lessons.  New guidance has been offered for improvements in 
data collection on a range of variables. 
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Figure 1  Plan view of station with platforms accessing all main (fast) and relief (slow) lines (1a) and showing direct access 
to relief (slow) lines only (1b) 
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Figures 2a and 2b  Photographs showing where a platform serving a fast line has been fenced off in an earlier 
intervention and where faster lines do not run close to platforms  
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Figure 3 Frequencies of fatality incidents by year across the locations in the three areas of the study, also showing the 
numbers of suicides nationally on the railway by year 
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Table 1 Summary of findings from studies investigating factors affecting railway suicide  
Factor Evidence from Literature 
National fatalities 
and Fatality rate 
Varying from 11 in a year in Australia to 936 in Germany [4].  Railway suicide attempts do 
not always result in fatality (e.g. due to train speed, the design of trains to lessen the impact 
and better sighting at some locations to enable stopping [4]).  14 studies were reviewed with 
fatality rates from 42.4-92% fatality [3]. 
 
Railway suicides as 
a proportion of 
national suicides 
 
Railway suicides represent a relatively small proportion of national suicides.  12 studies were 
reviewed with rail suicide as a proportion of national suicides varying from 1% to 12% [3]. 
Age There is an indication that younger people are more likely to choose this type of violent 
death [6], [7], [8].  The higher proportions of younger people choosing this method might be 
explained by impulsiveness or the difficulty in accessing other means of suicide, such as 
using medication [9].  There are various descriptions of age distributions, where the 
dominant age group is in the years 40-60 [4], though there are still large numbers of younger 
and older people taking their lives in this way. 
 
Gender There is a slight male dominance [10], [11], though the degree of this varies across studies 
e.g. 16 studies were reviewed with male to female ratio 1.1:1 to 9:1 [3]; 8 studies with male 
to female ratio 1.55:1 to 3.78:1 [4]).   
 
Marital status The marital status of those committing suicide differs across studies from Canada, USA and 
Australia. Whilst it has been suggested that being married can reduce the risk of suicide there 
are still sizeable proportions of people who are married or in relationships committing 
suicide [4].  
 
Socioeconomic 
status 
There may be some relationships with unemployment, living alone, communal living or 
temporary housing [3], [4].  It can be difficult to find relationships involving socioeconomic 
data and suicides at railway locations (e.g. these were not clearly established in the UK [12]), 
though there were some links between indicators of lower socioeconomic status and metro 
suicides [4]. 
 
Health status 
(including mental 
health) 
A good number of studies show associations between suicide and psychiatric problems [4].  
People with bipolar affective disorder were found to be more likely to choose rail suicide as 
it is perceived to be sudden death, and there are also links to impulsiveness [13].  However, 
there are other studies that show a high proportion of rail suicides involving people without 
any history of psychiatric care [14].  Other factors such as loneliness, ending of relationships, 
depression and anxiety, worries about financial problems are potential influencers [15].  
Drugs and alcohol can play a part, but there is variable evidence so far (e.g. from 2% 
involving intoxication [16], 10% [17], 20-30% [18], [19], [20], 70% [21], [22]. 
 
Precipitating factors Factors thought to trigger a suicide event include use of alcohol or drugs, disputes with 
partners / family, changes in emotions, stopping medication, legal problems or sources of 
humiliation [4]. 
 
Suicide threats and 
previous attempts 
In some studies, high proportions of those involved have made previous attempts or serious 
threats to kill themselves.  These figures vary a lot between studies (possibly because this 
type of data is not easily recorded) (from 2% to 81% across several studies [4]). It has been 
suggested [4] that this is indicative of forethought and planning in many suicides. 
 
Behaviour 
immediately before 
suicide attempts 
There have been a few studies in this area, identifying a range of behaviours or actions (e.g. 
dropping bags or leaving possessions, removing shoes, having personal items, avoiding eye 
contact, erratic gestures, wandering aimlessly, unusual clothing, movements at stations [15], 
[20],  [22], [23].  Different modes of access to the railway have been classified (e.g. jumping, 
lying, wandering on the tracks [24], [25]). These studies generally lack detail about the 
collection and description of the behaviours, but contain simple accounts or classifications of 
actions.  These frequently relate to behaviours which occur very close to the point of 
collision and may have limited value in terms of prevention.   
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Factor Evidence from Literature 
 
Timing 
- Seasonal and 
monthly 
variations 
- Weekly variations 
- Hourly variations 
There appear to be either no effects, very small or variable effects of seasons / months of the 
year [26], [27], [28], [29].   Some peaks and periods with lower numbers have been 
identified in various countries [4].  There may be more rail suicides at the beginning of the 
week (possibly triggered by concerns about work) and lower numbers at weekends [27], 
[30], [31].  In one study, peaks have been identified shortly after sunset and a second peak 
approximately ten hours earlier, shifting with sunset time [30]. Another study shows other 
peaks in numbers (e.g. between 9 and 12 in the morning and 6 and 9 in the evening, with 
higher mortality at night time [32]).  Numbers might be influenced by times when people are 
travelling or accessing the station and when there is a greater frequency of trains.  If a higher 
risk time could be established this might help with planning interventions (e.g. scheduling 
security patrols). 
 
Geography of 
railway suicides 
- Proximity of 
residence 
- Clusters and 
hotspots 
- Proximity of 
mental health 
services 
- Population and 
railway traffic 
density 
- Location on 
railway property 
Suicides generally occur where people can get access (e.g. at stations and crossings, where 
the railway is largely fenced elsewhere) [9], often in densely populated areas [33].  In more 
rural areas, access is usually via level crossings or at bridges or near tunnels [34]. There are 
locations where there are greater frequencies (possibly where fencing is poorer or close to 
psychiatric institutions) [9], [10]. Definitions of what involves a cluster or hotspot vary [4].  
In several countries it is clear that some stations or locations have greater proportions of 
events than others (e.g. 54% of suicides on 12% of the network) [9]. Data have been 
presented which compare numbers of incidents at stations, crossings and open line across 5 
countries (e.g. in UK 39% at stations, 47% on the open track and 12% at crossings) [4]; in 
Germany, three times more suicide attempts occurred on open lines than stations [27] and 
fast track lines were correlated with higher mortality.  Intentional deaths are more prevalent 
on lines with frequent passenger trains [35]. 
Events usually occur close to home [36], [8].    Higher rates of suicides were found when 
stations were crowded, when there were faster trains and when high risk groups were 
attracted to these stations [11]. 
In one study [9] it was found that railway parameters (e.g. numbers of train passengers, 
frequency of trains, passenger kilometres, train kilometres, railway density, familiarity with 
the railway) and population parameters (population density) did not influence suicide 
numbers at a regional level in the Netherlands.  In a later study train frequency and 
population density did have an association with rail suicides in the Netherlands and Germany 
[37].  In a systematic review of socio-environmental determinants of railway suicide positive 
associations were found involving train frequency, faster trains, distance to historical sites, 
railway length, growth of railway length, numbers of train passengers, population density 
[5]. 
 
Knowledge of 
previous events 
Family members may be at increased risk of suicide after the death of a family member by 
suicide [14].  Several studies have reported on the increase in events after reporting of a rail 
suicide of a famous person [38] and there have been clusters of suicide following from a 
highly publicised event) [35].  70% of suicides are not associated with copycat incidents 
[35].  
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Table 2 Descriptive details of the three areas in the study 
 
 Location 
Descriptive detail Area L Area S Area W 
No. of stations 23 8 20 
 
Approximate 
geographical length 
of track 
 
75 miles, running north west 
from London  
 
10 miles, running south 
from London 
 
50 miles, running west 
from London 
 
Descriptions of 
stations within the 
area 
 
Two large stations with 6 
platforms and 6 million 
users (National Rail entry 
and exit figures). 
Twenty one small to 
medium  urban and rural 
stations (0.07-2.8 million 
users), with 2-6 platforms 
5-11 non-stopping trains per 
hour on fast lines on this 
route. 
 
One large station with 6 
platforms and 20.9 
million users. 
Eight small to medium 
urban stations (0.6-3.7 
million users), with 4-6 
platforms.   
4-16 non-stopping trains 
per hour on fast lines on 
this route. 
 
One very large station 
with thirteen platforms 
and 15.4 million users 
per year.  There are few 
non-stopping passenger 
trains at this station.   
One large station, with 
six platforms and 5.6 
million users.   
Seventeen smaller, urban 
and rural stations, with 
between 2-4 platforms 
and 0.2 to 5.3 million 
users. 
9-19 non-stopping trains 
per hour on fast lines on 
this route. 
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Table 3  Outline of the variables, category breakdown and details of method of analysis 
Variable and description of data available Source, rationale and methods of classification 
Location: Crossing; Open line; Station; Train; Not known To determine the location of events (e.g. in station, out of station, part 
of the platform if possible).  The classification looked initially at the 
classification in the SMIS database, but also cross-checked this with 
detail in the narrative field of the database.  Determination of whether 
the event was in station (including the approach to and the exit from 
the station) was done using data in the narrative text field.   
Station 
Selection from 51 stations within the 3 study areas 
The event is associated with the nearest station, based on information 
within the SMIS database.  It is recognised that the event can occur 
outside the station (see the location field).   
Line on which the incident occurred: Faster (Down fast / 
Down main, Up fast / Up Main); Slower (Down relief / 
Down slow, Up relief / Up slow, Down DC (electric), Up 
DC (electric), Other); Not known; Not relevant 
This was not classified in the database, so was identified from the 
narrative text field and with supplementary data from railway staff 
where necessary using the identification headcode for the train 
involved. There are some different naming conventions for lines on 
different rail routes.  The category “not relevant” was used in the small 
number of cases where the event was not connected to collision with a 
train or touching of the power supply. 
Place of access: Platform; Platform end; Bridge; Other 
access point (Access gate; Crossing; Embankment; 
Footpath; From a train; Lineside fence; Road); Not known 
This was not classified in the database, so was identified from the 
narrative text field, where sufficient information has been available.   
Time of the event: Time of incident (Hours / minutes); Day 
of the week; Month of the year; Year (from 1994-2013); 
Not known 
The time and date of the incident is listed in the SMIS database.  
Additional categorical fields were established for day, month and year 
for analysis in this study.  Occasionally, the time of the event is 
unknown (e.g. in circumstances where a driver may notice a body on 
the track, resulting from an earlier event). 
Time classification: Evening peak; morning peak; night, 
early morning; off-peak; Not known 
 
Classification, based on time of day, with evening peak 4.00pm to 
8.00pm, morning peak 5.00am to 9.00am, off peak 9.00am to 4.00pm 
and night / early morning 8.00pm to 5.00am. 
Daylight / visibility: Dark; Dawn and Dusk; Daylight; 
Other (in tunnels, on train); Not known 
Data on time / date has been used to classify the lighting conditions, 
using a web-based calculator 
http://www.timeanddate.com/sun/uk/london.    
Train type: Freight; Freight – intermodal; Loco 
hauled/push-pull passenger; Parcel train; Passenger diesel 
multiple unit; Passenger electric multiple unit; Passenger 
High Speed Train; Passenger multiple unit; Not known 
Classification of train type has been based on the pre-existing 
classification for train type in the SMIS database.   
Witnesses, crowding:  
Open line –Driver and other rail staff; Police / security / 
emergency staff witnesses; Public / passenger witnesses; not 
known 
Station –Driver and other rail staff; Police / security / 
emergency staff witnesses; Public / passenger witnesses; not 
known 
Classification of witnesses to the event is based on content from the 
narrative text field in SMIS.   
Mental health: Mental health issues (depression and 
various non-specific issues); In-patients or out-patients at a 
psychiatric hospital; Previous suicide attempt or threat; not 
known 
The classification is based on the field for personal circumstances from 
SMIS, plus other contents of the narrative field in SMIS.  
Other social and health related: drugs / alcohol; family 
link to previous suicide; finance / loss of livelihood / 
homeless; legal / suspected of serious crime; multiple 
factors (finance, drugs alcohol); other medical problems; 
Relationship problems; not known. 
The classification is based on the field for personal circumstances from 
SMIS, plus other contents of the narrative field in SMIS. 
Gender: Male; female; not entered Data from the field in SMIS. Cross-tabulation and Chi-square analysis 
to examine association between gender and location and lighting 
conditions. 
Age: Count of events where age recorded (Age if known, 
otherwise apparent age entered as a range); count of not 
entered; mean, sd by area, range. 
Data from the field in SMIS.  Cross-tabulation and Chi-square analysis 
to examine association between age and location and lighting 
conditions. 
Behaviour Classification of sequences of immediate and precursor behaviours, 
plus other descriptive content and factors affecting behaviours, based 
on the narrative content from SMIS. 
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Table 4  Overview of the findings for different data types for three study areas,  including overall results and 
the variation  across the separate areas (based on N=257, unless otherwise stated) 
34 
 
Variable  Numbers of incidents Proportion of 
incidents (upper and 
lower limits) 
Interpretation 
Area 
L 
Area 
S 
Area 
W 
Total 
Location  
Incidents at: 
      
 
The proportion of events at stations is higher than reported 
previously in national data for stations [4].  There is variation 
across the samples from the three study areas.   
Only one event occurred at a crossing (most crossings have been 
closed on these lines for a considerable period of time).   
There was no association between age/gender and choice of 
location (stations or the open line) for suicide. 
 
Stations 67 28 88 183 0.71 (0.63-0.82) 
Crossings 1 0 0 1 0.00 (0.00-0.01) 
Open line 38 6 28 72 0.28 (0.18-0.36) 
On trains  1 0 0 1 0.00 (0.00-0.01) 
Line on which the 
incident occurred 
Incidents on: 
     There is a dominance of fast line events, especially within 
stations.  However, there are an appreciable number of events 
occurring on slower lines.   
In approximately 4% of cases it was not possible to establish the 
line on which the incident occurred. There was no association 
between gender and the choice of fast or other lines for suicide.  
More people than would have been expected in the age group 
over 60 were involved in suicides on the slower lines (Pearson 
Chi-square 9.055, df 2, p=0.011). 
Fast lines 64 25 91 180 0.70 (0.60-0.78) 
Other lines 39 7 22 68 0.26 (0.19-0.36) 
Line not known 4 2 3 9 0.04 (0.03-0.06) 
Incidents at stations 
(N=183): 
     
Fast line events  38 22 75 135 0.74 (0.56.0.85) 
Other lines 26 4 10 40 0.22 (0.11-0.39) 
Line not known 3 2 3 8 0.04 (0.03-0.07) 
Place of Access      
Access from the platform 
[platform end] 
68 
[7] 
28 
[5] 
90 
[9]  
186 
[21] 
0.69 (0.56-0.85) 
0.08 (0.07-0.11) 
Access is predominantly from a platform.   
The records indicate that there has been limited access from the 
platform end across the sample areas.  It is not known if this 
reflects true access rates from this location or whether accurate 
details on the point of access are not known or not recorded in 
the database. 
There was access from a bridge in a small number of cases. 
It was not possible to determine any access point in around 15% 
of the cases.    
Access from a bridge 9 0 7 16 0.06 (0-0.09) 
Other access point  11 1 4 16 0.06 (0.03-0.1) 
Access point not recorded 19 5 15 39 0.15 (0.13-0.18) 
Day of the week       
A smaller proportion of incidents occurring on a Sunday might 
be accounted for by fewer trains and passengers on account of 
the weekend timetable. Slightly higher numbers occurring at the 
beginning of the week and fewer at the weekend are consistent 
with some earlier studies in the literature [27],[30], [31]. 
 
Monday 17 4 20 41 0.16 (0.12-0.17) 
Tuesday 13 4 16 33 0.13 (0.12-0.14) 
Wednesday 21 4 13 38 0.15 (0.11-0.2) 
Thursday 10 10 16 36 0.14 (0.09-0.29) 
Friday 21 5 15 41 0.16 (0.13-0.2) 
Saturday 16 4 18 38 0.15 (0.08-0.15) 
Sunday 9 3 17 29 0.11 (0.08-0.15) 
Not known 0 0 1 1 0.00 (0.00-0.01) 
Month of the year       
 
There are some differences evident by month, though the 
seasonal / monthly effects in the literature have been found to be 
different across countries [4]. In the current study the numbers 
were lowest in June and August, and highest in July and 
September.  There is quite a lot of variation across the study 
areas. 
January 9 2 9 20 0.08 (0.06-0.08) 
February 5 3 12 20 0.08 (0.05-0.1) 
March 13 2 6 21 0.08 (0.05-0.12) 
April 10 5 9 24 0.09 (0.08-0.15) 
May 11 6 4 21 0.08 (0.03-0.18) 
June 5 0 10 15 0.06 (0.00-0.09) 
July 12 1 16 29 0.11 (0.03-0.14) 
August 7 3 7 17 0.07 (0.06-0.09) 
September 11 4 14 29 0.11 (0.1-0.12) 
October 8 3 10 21 0.08 (0.07-0.09) 
November 6 1 13 20 0.08 (0.03-0.11) 
December 10 4 6 20 0.08 (0.05-0.12) 
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Time classification       
The highest proportion of incidents occurred off-peak, perhaps 
when stations were less crowded, though there is need for some 
caution in interpreting these findings as they are based on 
unequal time periods (i.e. shorter peak time periods, longer off 
peak and night time hours). 
Day time off peak events  53 16 51 120 0.47  
(0.44-0.5) 
Events at night or early 
morning  
22 7 28 57 0.22 
(0.21-0.24) 
Events at evening peak 19 10 22 51 0.20  
(0.18-0.29) 
Events at morning peak 13 1 14 28 0.11  
(0.03-0.12) 
Not known 0 0 1 1 0.00 (0.00-0.01) 
Daylight / visibility       
 
The majority of incidents occurred in hours of daylight.  Lower 
numbers occurred in the dark, potentially influenced by fewer 
trains running at night time and more difficult access to trains. 
The findings are not indicative of the type of peak at sunset that 
has been identified in earlier work [30] and are not easily 
comparable with other analyses in the literature, which show 
peaks in mid-morning and evening [32].  There was no 
association between gender/age and the choice of suicide in 
different lighting conditions (e.g. daylight, dark, dawn / dusk). 
Events in daylight  75 26 73 174 0.68  
(0.63-0.76) 
Events in the dark 22 4 28 54 0.21  
(0.11-0.24) 
Events at dawn and dusk 8 4 13 25 0.1  
(0.07-0.12) 
Other events (in tunnels, on 
train) 
2 0 0 2 0.01 (0-0.02) 
Not known 0 0 2 2 0.01 (0-0.02) 
Train type       
 
Only a modest proportion of records specifically recorded the 
involvement of high speed trains, though in practice many of the 
train types will travel at a high line speed.  The train type was 
not recorded in almost half of the incidents 
High speed passenger train  6 0 33 39 0.15 (0-0.28) 
Passenger multiple unit 29 19 35 83 0.40   
(0.33-0.79) 
Freight train 7 0 2 9 0.04  
(0-0.08) 
Other train (parcel, loco-
hauled passenger) 
2 0 0 2 0.01 (0-0.02) 
Not known 63 15 46 124 0.48 (0.4-0.59) 
Witnesses, crowding 
People witnessing events 
at: 
      
 
 
 
 
In the majority of cases these events were only witnessed by the 
driver.  The absence of other witnesses could indicate that the 
events did not occur on crowded platforms, though this might 
also be indicative of incomplete recording of any witness details.   
Stations      
Driver and other rail 
staff 
50 23 70 143 0.78 (0.75-0.82) 
Police, security or 
emergency staff 
1 0 0 1 0.01 (0.00-0.01) 
Public or passenger 
witnesses 
1 2 8 11 0.06 (0.01-0.09) 
No witness recorded 15 3 10 28 0.15 (0.11-0.22) 
Open line      
Driver and other rail 
staff 
18 6 14 38 0.53 (0.47-1.00) 
Public or passenger 
witnesses 
1 0 3 4 0.06 (0.00-0.11) 
No witness recorded 19 0 11 30 0.41 (0.00-0.50) 
Other locations (Crossing, 
train) 
     
Driver and other rail 
staff 
1 0 0 1 0.50 (0.00-0.50) 
No witness recorded 1 0 0 1 0.50 (0.00-0.5) 
Mental health      
Mental health issues 
(Depression, various non-
specific issues) 
24 4 17 45 0.17  
(0.11-0.22) 
There were relatively small proportions of incidents with mental 
health issues recorded.  There is mixed evidence in the literature 
on the contribution of mental health issues [4], [13], [14], though 
mental health issues are thought to be a contributor to these 
types of events. The absence of this detail might be explained by 
gaps in knowledge or recording of this type of information in the 
database. 
In-patients or out-patients 
at a psychiatric hospital 
1 2 4 7 0.02  
(0.01-0.06) 
Previous suicide attempts 0 2 4 6 0.02 (0-0.06) 
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Not known 82 26 91 199 0.77 (0.76-0.78) 
Other social and health 
related 
      
 
There were very few records for these types of details in the 
available data sources. Evidence from the literature suggests that 
many of these factors are likely to be important contributory 
factors to these events [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], 
[22]. 
 
Drugs / alcohol 2 0 1 3 0.01 (0.00-0.02) 
Family link to previous 
suicide 
0 0 1 1 0.00 (0.00-0.01) 
Finance / loss of livelihood 
/ homeless 
0 1 1 2 0.01 (0.00-0.03) 
Legal / suspected of 
serious crime 
1 0 3 4 0.02 (0.00-0.03) 
Multiple factors (e.g. 
finance, drugs alcohol) 
1 0 0 1 0.00 (0.00-0.01) 
Other medical problems 0 0 2 2 0.01 0.00-0.02) 
Relationship problems 0 2 4 6 0.02 (0.00-0.06) 
Not known 103 31 104 238 0.93 (0.90-0.96) 
Gender       
 
 
The higher proportion of males is consistent with findings from 
the literature [3], [4], [10], [11], though there is still a sizeable 
proportion of females involved in these types of incidents. The 
proportion of males increases to 0.76 (0.74-0.78) (female 0.24 
(0.22-0.26)), based on the 218 cases where gender is known. 
There was no association between gender and study variables for 
location and timing of the event. 
Male 67 22 77 164 0.64  
(0.62-0.66) 
Female 19 7 27 53 0.21 (0.18-0.23) 
Not known 21 6 12 39 0.15 (0.10-0.20) 
Age  
Numbers where age is 
known 
60 22 70 152 Mean 40.6 (39.8-41.6) 
SD 14.5 (13.4-15.9) 
Range 16-80 
Age was recorded for many of those involved, but was often 
estimated or shown as a range in some cases in the SMIS data 
sheets, so limited data analyses are presented in this study.  No 
age data was available in 105 events.  There was an age related 
association, with higher than expected numbers of older people 
being involved in events on slower lines. 
 
 
 
. 
 
Behaviour 
 
Details of behaviour have been extracted from the narrative text in the database and presented later in this paper. 
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Table 5  Extract showing fatality incidents on different lines in the vicinity of 6 consecutive stations, by year 
 
 
  
Year
Pilot area 1 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Grand Total
Station a 1 2 3
Down main 1 1
Up Main 1 1
Other 1 1
Starion b 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 18
Down main 1 1 2
Up Main 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 13
Up relief 1 1
Not known 1 1 2
Station c 1 1 1 1 4
Up Main 1 1 2
Down relief 1 1
Up relief 1 1
Station d 1 1 1 2 5
Down main 1 1 2
Up Main 1 1 2
Up relief 1 1
Station e 1 2 2 3 1 1 4 1 15
Down main 1 1 1 3
Up Main 1 1 3 1 4 1 11
Not known 1 1
Station f 1 1 1 1 4 8
Down main 4 4
Up Main 1 1 1 3
Other 1 1
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Table 6a Sequences of behaviours and other descriptive content for events involving late movements in front of the train 
Precursor behaviour  Immediate 
behaviour or 
action 
Other descriptors prior to / during 
impact  
Commentary / Interpretation 
Movements 
Walked / ran to the edge of the platform (21) 
Moved from behind an object (6) 
Walked / ran along the platform (1) 
Danced to the edge of the platform (1) 
Stepped back temporarily (2) 
 
Waiting behaviours 
Stood close to the platform edge (13) 
Stood alone on the platform (3) 
Waited on the platform (1) 
Sat  on a bench (1) 
Sat on the platform (1) 
Acting strangely, making rocking motions back and forth (1) 
 
Looking / searching 
Looked for the train (2) 
Looked at the train before jumping (1) 
Looked towards the driver (1) 
 
 
 
Jumped / stepped 
from the platform 
into the path of the 
train (86) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Dived off the platform as if into a 
swimming pool (1) 
Dived in front of the train (1) 
Arms in the air / arms outstretched  (1) 
Crouched down and rolled off the 
platform (1) 
 
Other explanatory details 
Driver sounded the horn (3) 
Several people on the platform (1) 
Seen at the station earlier in the day and 
taken home by police (1) 
Seen at the station earlier in the day (1) 
Pulled her coat up around her head 
before jumping (1) 
These involved very late movement into the path of the train, 
with very little opportunity for others to intervene, especially 
where running to the platform edge or from behind an object.  
The precursor behaviours have been categorised and 
presented here as a list.  It is possible to identify some short 
sequences of behaviours in the original data (e.g. moving 
from behind an object – walking / running to the edge of the 
platform), though these are not represented here for reasons 
of clarity in presentation of the findings.   
There are some behaviours that could increase the chance of 
detection (e.g. unusual behaviour such as sitting on the 
platform, unusual motions, standing close to the platform 
edge, looking for the train, being seen earlier at the station).  
However, it can be hard to separate these from other 
behaviours that are typical of passengers at stations.  Sitting 
on a bench is not unusual, but with more detail, there may be 
something that would indicate a greater risk of incident.  
More descriptive detail is provided on how the person got 
onto the track or what they did just before impact for seven of 
the incidents.   
It is clear that several drivers were aware of a risk (sounding 
the horn). 
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Table 6b  Sequences of behaviours and other descriptive content for events where the person is on the track for a period of time before impact with 
the train 
Precursor behaviour  Immediate 
behaviour or 
action 
Other descriptors prior to / during 
impact  
Commentary / Interpretation 
Movements 
Jumped / stepped from the platform onto the line (21) 
Jumped / stepped from a (different) platform onto the line (1) 
Walked ran to the edge of the platform (2) 
Moved from behind an object (2) 
Jumped / ran / walked out of the bushes onto the track (5) 
Walked down the embankment (1) 
Climbed over / through a lineside fence (1) 
Jumped / stepped onto the track (3) 
Walked / ran across the tracks (2) 
Walked / ran on the tracks (2) 
Walked / jumped in front of the train (2) 
 
Waiting behaviours 
Sat on the platform edge (1) 
Stood alone on the platform (1) 
Stood close to the platform edge (1) 
 
Stood on the track 
in the path of the 
train (41) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Crouched down (1) 
Turned and faced the train (2)  
Facing the train (1) 
Looking towards the driver (2) 
Turned sideways (2) 
Turned to face away from the train (2) 
Arms in the air / arms outstretched (6) 
Covered ears (1) 
 
Other explanatory details 
Driver sounded the horn (5) 
Dressed in black (1) 
Limited sighting for the driver as the 
train came round a curve (1) 
In this type of event the person is on a track for a period of 
time before the impact.  In almost half of these, access was 
directly from the platform onto the line on which the train 
was travelling.  The remaining incidents involved movement 
across tracks from another platform, from behind objects or 
entering the track from bushes or the lineside in locations 
outside of the station, before walking / jumping in front of the 
train from track level.  Running across the tracks and running 
along the tracks are differentiated where it has been possible 
to do so.  
The records refer to warnings from the driver in a small 
number of cases, though this may not accurately reflect the 
number of warnings that would have been issued.   
Additional descriptive details are given for many of the 
events.  It is possible that more detail has been provided in 
these cases because the driver had more time to see the event 
unfolding.   
Movements 
Jumped / stepped from the platform onto the line (7) 
Jumped / stepped from a (different) platform onto the line (2) 
Moved from behind an object (1) 
Jumped / ran out of bushes on to the track (1) 
Walked / ran across the tracks  
Walked / ran on the tracks (2)  
 
Looking / searching 
Looked for the train (2) 
Walked / jumped 
in front of the 
train (18) 
 
 These incidents involved a movement towards the train from 
track level, including moving along and across tracks.  Initial 
access to the track was from a platform in half of the cases.  
There are relatively few precursor behaviours, though where 
present these give some details of looking for trains, moving 
from places of concealment, or how people accessed the track 
at a place other than a station. 
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Precursor behaviour  Immediate 
behaviour or 
action 
Other descriptors prior to / during 
impact  
Commentary / Interpretation 
Movements  
Jumped / stepped from the platform onto the line (15) 
Walked / ran on the tracks (1) 
Jumped / stepped onto the track (1) 
Moved from behind an object (1) 
 
Waiting behaviours 
Knelt on the track (1) 
Speaking on a mobile phone (1) 
Stood close to the platform edge (2) 
Did not get on a stopping train (1) 
 
Laid down on the 
track in the path of 
the train (22) 
Lying face up looking upwards (1) 
  
Other explanatory details 
Driver sounded the horn (4) 
Covered the upper part of the body in a 
plastic sack (1) 
 
 
In this group of incidents the immediate behaviour describes 
how the person took specific action to make contact with the 
train.  More than half involved access from the platform.  
Few events seem to have involved crossing the track.  The 
precursor behaviours are similar to other events.  In most 
cases the access to the track was observed and is close in time 
to the approach of the train.  There were four where the 
access to the track was not observed.  Only one contained 
reports of efforts of the person to conceal themselves. Drivers 
reported issuing warnings in a small number of these events. 
Movements  
Jumped / stepped from the platform onto the line (7) 
Jumped / stepped from a (different) platform onto the line (1) 
Walked / ran across the tracks (1) 
Walked / ran along the platform (1) 
 
Waiting behaviours 
Laid down on the track in the path of the train (3) 
 
Looking / searching 
Waved at the driver (1) 
 
Placed head on the 
rail in the path of 
the train (15) 
  
  
  
This series of events also includes description of the 
immediate behaviour of how the person made contact with 
the train. In one of the cases the person was seen stepping 
from a different platform and crossing the tracks.  
Movements 
Jumped / stepped from the platform onto the line (6) 
Pushed past passengers (1) 
Jumped / stepped from a (different) platform onto the line (1) 
Walked / ran across the tracks (1) 
Walked / ran to the edge of the platform (1) 
 
Other behaviours 
Disembarked from a  train (1) 
 
Crouched on the 
track in the path of 
the train (7) 
  
  
  
  
  
Curled into a ball (1) 
Appeared to be looking for something 
on the track (1) 
Bent down as if to pick something up 
(1) 
  
In this subset of incidents the immediate behaviour describes 
what the person did after getting access directly from the 
platform or crossing tracks from another platform.  Earlier 
behaviour included physical efforts to get to the track by 
pushing past passengers and moving directly from getting off 
a train to get onto the railway. 
Movements 
Jumped / stepped from the platform onto the line (1) 
 
Knelt on the track 
(1) 
 Limited details were available for these two examples of 
immediate behaviours before being struck by the train.  In 
each case the person was seen to step onto the track from the 
platform, implying a short period of time before the arrival of 
the train.  Some additional descriptive detail is provided in 
one case as the person awaited the train. 
Movements 
Jumped / stepped from the platform onto the line (1) 
Sat on the track (1) Head lowered waiting for the impact (1) 
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Table 6c  Sequences of behaviours and other descriptive content for events where the person is moving around on the track prior to impact 
Precursor behaviour  Immediate 
behaviour or 
action 
Other descriptors prior to / during 
impact  
Commentary / Interpretation 
    
Movements 
Jumped / stepped from a different platform onto the line (3) 
Walked / ran along the platform (1) 
Walked / ran 
across the tracks 
(3) 
The driver lost sight of the person 
before impact (1) 
Other explanatory details 
Driver sounded the horn (1) 
 
In these three subsets of incidents it is not clear from the 
content of the reports what happened after getting onto the 
line (i.e. whether the person stood on the track in the path of 
the train, laid down or moved towards the train, as in other 
chains of events). It is not clear from the reports how long the 
people were in the track area.  There are reports of moving 
along and across tracks. 
The immediate behaviours in these sequences are precursor 
behaviours in a number of other incidents.  In the first 
example there is one event where the driver reports losing 
sight of the person, but this is not explicit in the other events.  
In many cases access was from a platform.  Drivers report 
issuing warnings in several of the events 
Movements 
Jumped / stepped from a different platform onto the line (2) 
Walked / ran across the tracks (1) 
Jumped / stepped from the platform onto the line (1) 
 
Walked / ran on 
the tracks (2) 
  
Facing the train (1) 
Not facing the train (1) 
Other explanatory details 
Driver sounded the horn (2) 
Movements 
Walked ran to the edge of the platform (2) 
 
Waiting behaviours 
Stood close to the platform edge (2) 
Sat on a bench (1) 
Jumped / stepped 
from the platform 
onto the line (9) 
  
Other explanatory details 
Driver sounded the horn  (1) 
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Table 6d  Sequences of behaviours and other descriptive content for events with other modes of contact with the train or other cause of death 
Precursor behaviour  Immediate 
behaviour or 
action 
Other descriptors prior / during 
impact or other cause of fatality 
Commentary / Interpretation 
Movements 
Jumped / fell from a bridge (3) 
Jumped / fell from a train or vehicle (1) 
On the track in the 
path of the train 
(4) 
  
  
  
  
This set of incidents contains details of a number of different 
types of immediate behaviours.  These accounted for 
relatively small numbers in each case and there are few 
precursor behaviours for several of these. 
The first describes limited detail about how several people 
were on the track after jumping or falling from height at a 
bridge or from a train. 
The next three refer to unusual situations where people made 
contact with the train from the platform (leaning, sitting over 
the edge, overhanging the platform edge in a prone position). 
The immediate behaviours in the final three events are also 
quite rare (contact with overhead power lines after running 
on tracks and climbing a power gantry, hanging from a 
bridge and setting oneself on fire). 
Limited details are available in the data sources in relation to 
these events. 
Waiting behaviours 
Stood close to the platform edge (1) 
Leaned forward 
into the path of the 
train (2) 
  
 
  
 
Sat on the 
platform with legs 
over the edge of 
the platform (2) 
 
  
 
  Laid down on the 
platform with head 
and shoulders 
overhanging into 
the path of the 
train (1) 
 
Seen at the station earlier in the day and 
questioned by rail staff (1) 
Movements 
Climbed a power line gantry (1) 
Walked ran on the tracks (1) 
 
 
Contact with 
overhead electrical 
power lines (1)  
  
  
 
 Hanging from a 
bridge (1) 
 
 
  Set on fire (1)   
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Table 7 New guidance for improvement in the collection and use of data on a range of relevant variables for railway suicide  
Variable Summary of evidence New guidance from the current study 
National fatalities 
and Fatality rate 
Fatalities, only, were considered in this study, which did not 
include national coverage of the rail system.  
Local situations may not reflect nationally reported data (e.g. there can be larger 
proportions of events at stations than national statistics would suggest).  Therefore, 
national patterns may not be helpful in understanding risk at a particular location.  It is 
important to collect additional descriptive detail on events to explore the potential for 
better prevention strategies at a local level. 
 
 
Age There is a range of age groups thought to be at greater risk of these 
incidents on the basis of previous research in the literature, 
especially younger people and mid-age of 40-60. 
 
 
People of all ages are involved in these incidents and prevention strategies need to take 
this into account. The age of people involved is not always evident in the early stage of 
compiling this type of record of events. 
Gender Previous studies show greater numbers of males involved in these 
incidents.  There were similar findings in the samples in the current 
study. 
 
 
Whilst more males die in these incidents, there is a still a sizeable proportion of females 
involved in these events.  
Health status 
(including mental 
health and suicide 
threats / previous 
attempts) 
 
Studies in the literature suggest the influence of mental health 
issues in rail suicide events.  There are gaps in the data in the 
current study in relation to knowledge of mental health problems in 
the people involved. 
Other sources of data are needed to explore the health status of individuals as a risk factor 
for rail suicide. 
 
 
 
Timing 
- Seasonal, 
monthly, 
weekly 
variations 
 
There are a range of conclusions in the literature on the timing of 
events (table 1).  Analysis in this study has looked at timing in 
relation to the day, month, peak / off peak hours for travel and 
lighting conditions.  It is clear that incidents can occur at all times 
of the day, week and year.     
 
People are likely to be influenced in different ways, so it can be difficult to predict how 
any individual would respond on the basis of time of day, week or month alone.  The 
choice of timing could be influenced by a range of factors (e.g. opportunity and the 
availability / frequency of trains; a desire for seclusion at night time or off-peak events). It 
will be important to understand more about why people choose different times to take their 
life on the railway.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geography of 
railway suicides 
- Proximity of 
residence 
Various studies in the literature have examined relationships 
between train suicides and geographical and rail contextual factors 
(linked to the location, train density, frequency).  The current study, 
in its focus on descriptive detail in samples of events, has examined 
It is important that industry / research records are able to reflect the range of locations that 
are important descriptors for an incident. Improvements can be made in collecting and 
recording important information on locations that are relevant for the event (e.g. precise 
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Variable Summary of evidence New guidance from the current study 
- Clusters and 
hotspots 
- Proximity of 
mental health 
services 
- Population and 
railway traffic 
density 
- Location on 
railway property 
some of the practical issues that can impact on the reliability of the 
data.   
Incidents do not always happen at the point of access to the railway 
(e.g. people often cross lines or move along the track and out of the 
station or away from crossings).   
The line on which an incident occurs does not always give an 
accurate indication of the train type and can lead to errors when 
classifying incidents in a national database (e.g. a fast, non-stopping 
train can be travelling on a slow line during a possession for 
engineering works). 
There is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that people select high 
speed trains for suicide.  The limited data on train types in the 
database make it difficult to draw firm conclusions, but the 
available data suggest that a range of train types (faster and slower) 
are involved in these events.   
The design of the infrastructure might encourage certain behaviours 
(e.g. hiding behind electrical cabinets, bridges, in vegetation or at 
curves in the track, structures on the platform).   
 
 
details of access points, the line of incident, the location of the incident, details of 
movement across or along lines). 
It is important that industry databases can record relevant details of anomalies in train 
operations and other local knowledge and circumstances, often known to local staff, and 
make this type of information available to users of the data.    
Prevention strategies therefore need to take account of the potential for events on faster 
and slower lines. 
 
 
Behaviour 
immediately 
before suicide 
attempts 
 
There is limited evidence from previous studies.  The analysis of 
text in the current study provides a better understanding of the type 
and frequencies of different behaviours 
Understanding more about the different sequences of behaviours of people prior to these 
events and the relative frequencies of these sequences gives better knowledge of where 
efforts could be targeted for prevention (e.g. knowing behaviours that could trigger 
suspicion in onlookers).  A more extensive study of behaviours, using details from a wider 
range of sources, would help to develop these findings.    
 
 
 
